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ABSTRACT 
We use a public interest approach to assess the impact of weak 
regulation and troubled labor relations on the Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organization (OTE) market and social 
performance since 1992. Our findings confirm that regulation in 
tandem with reduced state ownership generally improves market 
and social performance. Much depends on the intensity of regulation, 
not just its scope. Labor also plays a critical role in tempering 
performance in critical junctures of the privatization cycle; in order 
to secure industrial peace in the short run political authorities 
undermine the company’s long-term market performance. The study 
sheds light on the political calculus of labor policy and state-business 
relations during and after privatization. 
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Politics, Labor, Regulation, and Performance:  
lessons from the privatization of OTE 
 
 
1. Introduction 
We seek to understand the impact of privatization by examining the country’s 
flagship project, the gradual privatization of the Hellenic Telecommunications 
Organization (OTE). Following Durant et al (1998), we differentiate between 
two types of performance: one that reflects market values and affects the 
company’s management and another that reflects social values and affects 
society at large. How do weak regulation and troubled labor relations affect 
OTE’s market and social performance? 
The criteria of performance change with privatization. Public sector bodies 
pursue many different goals, while private companies focus more squarely on 
economic performance. For this reason, we follow a public interest approach 
which couples the monitoring of economic performance and the achievement 
of social objectives. Analysts contend that increasing market exposure through 
reduced state ownership, regulation, and status of public disclosure 
significantly affects performance. Generally, as market exposure increases, 
market- and social-based performance improves. We argue that shifting 
degrees of political involvement through regulatory intensity and labor 
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relations refract the hypothesized beneficial effects of reductions in state 
ownership.  
We have chosen to focus on OTE because of its importance for the Greek 
market. In this way, OTE becomes a linchpin by which we may gauge the 
progress of privatization. Being one of the biggest companies on the Greek 
stock exchange, its fate and financial health reverberate throughout the national 
economy. In addition, potentially lower social and financial performance 
indicators may retard Greece’s efforts to modernize given the importance that 
telecommunications play in everyday life in general and economic 
development in particular. We examine primarily issues regarding fixed-
telephony because mobile telephony or data services were introduced after 
privatization began. In that case, a pre/post design becomes impossible. 
 
2. The Privatization of OTE 
OTE was gradually privatized in the 1990s and 2000s through successive 
minority share offerings. Like the entire Greek privatization program, the sale 
of OTE was crucially driven by revenue-raising incentives (Pagoulatos, 2005). 
However, the policy ended up fundamentally transforming the structure and 
operation of both OTE and the telecoms market. After a daring but aborted 
effort of the ND government in 1992 to transfer 49 percent-plus-management 
of OTE to the private sector, the post-1993 PASOK governments adopted a less 
confrontational, gradualist approach, which emphasized the retention of public 
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control over major public utilities such as OTE. The strategy evolved under the 
second Simitis government of 2000-04 into a bolder choice of crossing the 49 
percent privatization threshold. Public control could still be made possible 
through a blocking minority stake, as long as the rest of the company’s shares 
were widely dispersed. Legislation in 2000 laid the ground for allowing private 
majority stakes. The legislated minimum public stake of 51 percent was 
lowered and eventually stood at 22 percent by 2008 (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. State Ownership of OTE 
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Since the mid-1990s, Greek authorities sought to integrate OTE to an 
international alliance (Mohan et al, 1996). However, towards the end of the 
1990s there was growing concern that OTE was missing the boat of 
technological change, at a time when South European telecoms organizations 
(the Spanish Telefonica, the Portuguese PT and Telecom Italia) were moving 
faster to joining strong international alliances (Jeronimo, 1997). The benefits of 
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partial privatization in terms of shareholder control and managerial efficiency 
were decreasing. Thus, reduction of state control to a minority stake sought to 
prepare the ground for the entry of a strategic partner.  
Though the revenue-raising incentive behind OTE’s privatization remained 
strong, the doctrine evolved. The PASOK governments of the 1990s sought to 
render OTE a healthy and profitable public enterprise delivering shareholder 
value to its public owner. OTE was turned into a “national champion”, leading 
Greek corporate expansion (alongside the National Bank of Greece) to the 
emerging markets of Southeastern Europe. However, underinvestment 
threatened OTE’s ability to catch up with the next big technological waves, 
such as broadband telephony. Thus, the “national champion” strategy gave way 
to internationalization through entry of, and transfer of management to, a major 
foreign strategic partner. After various vicissitudes, the policy finally 
materialized in 2008, with the entry of Deutsche Telekom, amounting to a 
belated or “slow” internationalization of OTE (Clifton, Díaz-Fuentes, and 
Revuelta, 2010). Deutsche Telekom bought an additional 3 percent of OTE’s 
shares, raising its existing stake of 22 percent to 25 percent plus one vote. 
Together the Greek government and Deutsche Telekom held a majority of 50 
percent plus 2 votes in OTE.1 A major reform of OTE’s employment regime in 
2006, in agreement with the company’s labor union federation (OME-OTE), 
led to the voluntary retirement of a large number of employees and liberalized 
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 In 2009 the Deutsche Telekom share rose to 30 percent and the government share was reduced to 20 
percent. 
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individual contracts for all future hiring, paving the way for the entry of the 
strategic partner.  
The 2001 liberalization of the telecoms sector, which was led by European 
integration imperatives (Clifton, Comín, and Fuentes, 2006), accelerated OTE’s 
restructuring in terms of internal management structures and quality of service. 
In view of liberalization, the government undertook a 160-billion drachmas 
investment program in 1997-2000, largely funded by the EC, from which OTE 
benefited significantly. When a public utility is forced to operate in a newly 
liberalized environment, strategies usually range between two poles. At one 
pole lies a strategy of disregarding the loss of market share and focusing on the 
priority of retaining existing profits. At the other pole lies the opposite strategy 
of seeking as a priority to retain market share even at the cost of accepting a 
reduction of profitability. OTE followed the second strategy to an extreme. In 
the areas where it faced competition, OTE limited its profit margins to as low 
as 2-3 percent, in order not to lose market share. Indeed, operational profits of 
OTE declined following the 2001 liberalization, but the decline was 
significantly offset by the large profitability of OTE’s mobile telephony 
subsidiary, Cosmote, launched belatedly but successfully in 1998. The latter 
accounted for an important share of the consolidated profits of the OTE Group. 
It can well be argued that OTE’s strategy was endogenous to its inherited 
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employment relations. Given the instituted job tenure of its personnel, a lower 
market share would also inevitably imply lower profitability2. 
 
3. Politics, Regulation, Labor, and Performance  
State involvement in corporate management has shifted in the last twenty years 
from direct methods of control, i.e., ownership, to indirect methods, i.e., 
regulation (Zahariadis, 1995). When it comes to telecommunications, the 
question is not whether state involvement wanes, but how well it aids enterprise 
performance in its market and social tasks. We contend that regulatory intensity 
(not just scope) and labor relations mediate the results, making them far less 
beneficial under certain conditions. However, we acknowledge that company 
performance also depends on many other internal and external factors, 
including managerial vision and strategy, labor skills, technological innovation, 
market maturity, and domestic and European legal and tax concerns (Bortolotti 
et al, 2002).  
Because of privatization, governments can no longer overtly affect company 
decisions. But they often appeal to the public interest in order to stay politically 
engaged via weak regulatory structures and periods of labor tension. Regulation 
is a form of state involvement (Latzer et al, 2006). It is expensive because of 
information costs. Regulators need to collect information to make decisions 
that stimulate competition and protect the public interest (Baumol, 1995). If 
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authorities do not have enough resources to collect this information 
independently, they have to rely on privatized companies, risking regulatory 
capture. Companies have incentives to selectively provide information that 
favors their pricing schemes or discriminates against potential competitors 
(Rees and Vickers, 1995). Such “weak” regulation also aggravates “the 
commitment problem.” The privatized company will not make substantial 
sunk-cost investments because it is uncertain about the regulator’s guarantee 
that external parties may not opportunistically exploit the situation ex post. The 
cost of capital is likely to increase. When capital costs are used to determine 
prices, prices are likely to rise to compensate for risk-adjusted returns by 
investors (Grout, 1995). Consequently, the quality of regulation is very 
important in assessing company performance. If the scope and intensity of 
regulation are weak, politicians will be called upon to arbitrate disputes either 
by regulatory authorities or by potential entrants. The narrower the regulatory 
regime, the greater the political involvement is likely to be in company 
management. More political involvement translates into a blurring of market-
based performance because politicians seek to satisfy national and special 
interest needs that go beyond the company’s “welfare.” Political interference is 
in this case more likely and more costly to the privatized company.   
 The Greek national regulator is Hellenic Telecommunications and Post 
Commission (EETT). It is an independent, self-funded decision-making body 
whose aim is “to promote the development of telecommunications, to ensure 
the proper operation of the market in the context of sound competition, and to 
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provide for the protection in the interests of end-users” (EETT, 2009).3 It was 
established in 1992 but did not commence operations until 1995. Its powers 
were further strengthened and broadened with laws 2867/2000 and 3431/2006. 
Changes in the regulatory regime provide a unique opportunity to assess three 
different phases of state involvement (Latzer et al, 2006). The first we call 
virtual regulation (1992-1995). The second phase we call weak regulation 
(1996-2000). The final phase, since 2001, we call arm’s length regulation.  
Concurrently, we track the various ownership sales by the Greek state to 
private investors. The first sale, which took place in 1996, coincides with the 
beginning of the weak regulatory period. The remaining sales, taking place 
over several years since 2001, occurred in the arm’s length regulatory period. 
We examine whether ownership sales precede or succeed stronger regulatory 
control. If they precede changes in regulatory control, we may attribute 
performance gains/losses in the qualitative analysis to privatization and reduced 
direct state involvement. If they succeed changes in regulation, we may 
attribute performance changes to regulatory control and indirect but 
strengthened state involvement. More direct state involvement, under virtual or 
weak regulatory conditions, is likely to increase market-based performance but 
reduce social-based performance. The reason is that private investors are 
interested in profitability and the financial health of the company. As such, 
management is likely to pay more attention to these indicators and reduce the 
temptation to interfere in operational management. The logic of privatization 
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demands that company health be made a priority for both management and 
state. Because successive governments wanted to increase interest in possible 
future sales, they needed to maintain a profitable and viable operator. However, 
the (virtual) presence of a weak regulator means that social objectives, such as 
reductions in call failures, increase of network reliability, and transparency of 
indicators through public disclosure will not be optimally pursued because they 
require resources that may be taken away from profits and other income-
generating activities. Simulation or nurturing of actual competition through 
regulation may likely achieve these objectives. Consequently, we expect social-
based performance to increase significantly only during the third period of 
arm’s length regulation. 
Privatization reduces labor benefits and increases labor anxiety about possible 
lay-offs. Consequently, unions become more militant. Labor relations 
deteriorate, but the rate of deterioration is managed by political parties because 
they control different unions. Acting in the name of the public interest, political 
parties use the uncertainty felt by labor to oppose or support government 
policies.  
Changes in ownership bring about a shift in company objectives. For various 
reasons, public sector companies tend to be overstaffed as political paymasters 
seek to placate various constituencies in ways that have little to do with the 
company’s profitability or financial welfare (Aharoni, 1986). The public sector 
is often used to provide political favors, buy votes especially in marginal 
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constituencies, and subsidize interest groups deemed beneficial by the 
government. Sale of ownership shares removes these effects and increases the 
pressure on management to become more attuned to private-sector objectives, 
i.e., to reduce costs. Unions interpret this strategy with due caution because it 
logically translates into labor-shedding (Haskel and Szymanski, 1994). 
Employment, therefore, is expected to fall with unions becoming more militant 
in an effort to prevent or avoid this fate. Higher rates of labor unrest are likely 
to reduce company performance as employee and management attention is 
focused on resolving operational differences rather than on increasing the 
quality or quantity of services (Ferner and Colling, 1993). Market- and social-
based performance indicators are likely to suffer as the company is gradually 
privatized. As long as the government continues to maintain part ownership 
and a presence in senior management, labor unions will continue to behave 
politically, seeking a political settlement to increasingly private labor-
management differences. Labor tension is more likely to subside when the 
government severs ownership ties with the now private company. Private 
management will likely drive a tougher bargain with labor because the range of 
issues separating the two is reduced. Politics is now less prominent because 
labor concerns are no longer a form of political protest. As differences between 
management and labor diminish, the company will focus more squarely on 
improving market- and social-based performance. 
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4. Hypotheses, data and measurement issues  
Based on the above discussion, we can derive the following hypotheses:  
H1: Gradual privatization increases market (H1.1) and social 
performance (H1.2) but it also increases political involvement by way of 
rising labor tension (H1.3). 
H2: Weaker regulatory intensity leads to higher market performance 
(H2.1) and lower social performance (H2.2). 
H3: Rising labor tension decreases market (H3.1) and social 
performance (H3.2). 
Our timeframe involves the period from 1992, which marks EETT’s creation, 
to 2008. It involves four years prior to OTE’s first sale of shares, offering a 
benchmark against which we examine subsequent performance. 
The dependent variables include market- and social-based performance. 
Market-based variables generally measure OTE’s financial health, measuring 
only fixed telephony, i.e., the parent company and not the OTE group which 
also includes Cosmote, a mobile telephony subsidiary. The variables include: 
 Labor Productivity, measured as revenues (million €) per employee per 
year corrected for inflation and logarithmically transformed; 
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 Capitalization, measured as capital expenditures in fixed assets (million 
€) per employee per year corrected for inflation and logarithmically 
transformed; 
 Profitability, measured as pre-tax profit (million €) deflated and 
logarithmically transformed;  
 Company Size, measured as total revenues (million €) deflated and 
logarithmically transformed. 
All data was taken from OTE, Annual Report (various years). Amounts were 
deflated using the GDP deflator in IMF, Yearbook of Financial Statistics 
(various years). 
Social-based variables capture the quality of services delivered by OTE. They 
are prescribed by EETT and include: 
 Technical faults, measured as technical faults per 100 connections;  
 Network Reliability, measured as percent of faults repaired within the 
next working day. 
We also collected data on call failure rates but unfortunately 11 years were 
missing. Moreover, the methodology for collecting such data was changed by 
EETT, rendering impossible comparisons before and after 2007. Data on 
directory assistance was equally sporadic. All data are taken from OTE, Annual 
Report (various years), supplemented, if necessary, by data provided directly 
by the company. 
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Our independent variables include:  
 Regulatory Intensity, measured as strength of regulatory powers (0 in 
years 1992-94, 1 in years 1995-1999, 2 in years 2000-2005, and 3 in 
years since 2006; 
 Status of Labor Relations, measured by  
a. hours lost, measured as number of man/hours lost due to strikes 
logarithmically transformed; 
b. annual real percent rise in compensation per employee; data are 
deflated using the consumer price index; 
c. number of employees in thousands logarithmically transformed; 
hiring more employees or paying them better gives us alternative 
measures of labor tension, hypothesizing higher pay increases make 
controversial management decisions more palatable to labor.  
 State Ownership, measured by  
a. degree of state ownership, as indicated by percent of shares owned 
by the state. 
We also collected data on number of EETT staff and budget as proxies for 
regulatory intensity. The idea is more resources in the form of more staff or 
higher budgets indicate greater regulatory intensity. Unfortunately, missing 
data precluded us from including these indicators in our statistical analysis. We 
could locate data on the number of EETT staff only since 1998 and data on 
EETT’s budget only since 1999. The short duration of available data makes any 
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statistical analysis using these indicators highly suspect. Data regarding labor 
relations and state ownership are taken from OTE, Annual Report (various 
years), supplemented, if necessary, by data provided directly by the company. 
Data about EETT are provided by EETT’s press information service. 
Control variables include: 
 General Macroeconomic Conditions, measured by two indicators: 
a. percent real economic growth; 
b. national unemployment rate (numbers unemployed as percent of 
civilian population). 
Data are taken from the IMF’s Yearbook of Financial Statistics (various years). 
We also collected data from 25 interviews with five key stakeholders of the 
company: government officials, EETT officials, OTE management, OTE labor 
(employees and relevant union members), and political groups (individuals 
from political parties who are knowledgeable and/or responsible for 
telecommunications). The interviews were semi-structured. The interviewees 
answered several questions, but they were also given flexibility to articulate 
their own concerns and opinions about other issues they considered relevant 
and important. The structure of the interviews precluded any coding schemes. 
The time frame of the project does not allow us to examine the effects of the 
entry of Deutsche Telekom in the management of OTE, but we addressed the 
expectations of key stakeholders regarding the change of management.   
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We use both quantitative and qualitative techniques to analyze the data. 
Quantitatively, we run a Prais-Winsten regression. However, the low number of 
degrees of freedom reduces the reliability of our findings. For this reason, we 
use the statistical results as preliminary guide and complement statistical 
influence with qualitative nuance. Qualitatively, we ask our interviewees about 
possible political influence and whether they perceive it has hampered the 
company’s performance. We use triangulation techniques to verify arguments. 
For example, we asked the same question of OTE managers and employees to 
verify the impact of a particular source. We also used a snowballing technique 
to identify individuals we may have missed. This involves asking interviewees 
about other important, knowledgeable individuals whom we should interview. 
Once interviewees no longer offer new names, we can be certain that we have 
interviewed the more important persons. 
 
5. A Statistical First Cut  
Does the state’s reduced ownership affect OTE’s performance? If so, to what 
extent do regulatory structure and (more-or-less) troubled labor relations affect 
OTE’s market- and social-based performance? Tables 1-3 summarize our 
findings. The models have a reasonably good fit, explaining in some instances 
more than 95 percent of the variance. However, the fit is poor when it comes to 
capitalization and profits. 
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Decreasing state ownership has a significant effect on most indicators of 
market performance (H1.1 – see Table 1). Labor productivity is negatively 
affected, confirming our expectation that as state ownership decreases, labor 
productivity increases. The same is true for overall size. Conventional wisdom 
appears to be correct, as government retreats from ownership, OTE’s market 
performance increases. Surprisingly perhaps, this is not the case with 
profitability, which appears not to be affected by state ownership. The low 
number of degrees of freedom precludes any additional analysis. Rather we use 
these as preliminary findings and leave the qualitative evidence, which follows 
this section, to fill in the rest of the story. 
Social-based performance follows the same path. As state ownership decreases 
over time, the number of technical faults also decreases. Under the same 
conditions, network reliability improves. Again, the findings confirm our 
expectations of the beneficial effects of privatization, even after taking into 
account the regulatory framework and macroeconomic controls (H1.2). 
Table 1 also includes estimates of the impact of regulation. As mentioned in the 
previous section, regulation was weaker in the years up to 1999 and has since 
been strengthened. The findings confirm somewhat the positive relationship 
between weak regulation and lower social performance (H2.2). As expected, 
when regulatory intensity increases over time, the number of technical faults 
decline. But the network’s reliability remains unaffected. However, the same 
cannot be said about regulation and market performance (H2.1). In three areas 
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of market performance—capitalization, size, and profits—regulation has no 
effect. Moreover, stronger regulation leads to higher labor productivity. Why? 
The reason has to do with competitive pressures. The main purpose of 
regulation in telecommunications is to meet social goals, prevent potential 
abuses due to predatory behavior, and stimulate competitive pressures to 
enhance consumer welfare. In all cases, labor productivity is likely to increase 
as companies become more efficient in their quest for higher profits under 
external regulatory constraints. The findings partly support Boylaud and 
Nicoletti’s (2001) cross-national findings regarding regulatory effects. 
Examining telecommunications firms in OECD countries during the period 
1993-97, the authors find that regulatory regimes but not state ownership 
account for improvements in labor productivity. Our findings from Greek 
telecommunications reveal that both do. It is possible that the Greek case is an 
outlier or that their shorter time frame yields misleading results. Nevertheless 
and somewhat contrary to conventional wisdom, ownership rather than 
regulation has the stronger and more robust impact. 
We checked the robustness of our findings in two ways. First, we re-ran the 
equations by measuring regulation as a dummy variable getting the value of 1 
during the third period of arm’s length regulation, i.e., since 2006; 0 otherwise. 
We also measured regulation as strengthening since 2000; 0 otherwise. As we 
postulated above, we expected social-based performance to be particularly 
affected only after the intensity of regulation reached a certain threshold. In 
both cases the findings do not support this argument. The results were exactly 
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the same, suggesting that the mere strengthening of regulation, rather than a 
particular threshold, has the anticipated impact. 
Second, variance inflation factors suggest the possibility of problematic levels 
of multicollinearity between state ownership and regulation; vif<6.5. As a 
result, the models may understate the true effects of either variable. In separate 
equations we estimated the effects of state ownership and regulation. The 
effects of state ownership stayed the same in all equations, adding more weight 
to our statistical findings. In the case of regulation, the results stayed the same 
except for size. When we don’t account for state ownership, strengthened 
regulation now becomes statistically significant. Stronger regulation leads to 
increases in company size as measured by revenues. State ownership appears to 
overshadow regulatory effects in some cases. All this elevates the significance 
of using qualitative evidence to complement the statistical results.  
Table 2 shows the impact of labor relations on performance. The effects of 
state ownership are almost identical to the ones in Table 1. This adds more 
weight to the statistical findings. However, labor tension seems to be unrelated 
to either market or social performance (H3.1 and H3.2). We re-ran the analyses 
using the number of strikes and strikers. The impact was similar; no relation. 
Why? Our interviewees note that labor issues have a significant effect on 
performance, especially profits, but it is possible that our numerical macro-
indicators do not capture the subtle impact of unionized labor. It is also 
possible that strikes for better pay or more benefits are less important than the 
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quality of labor’s skills on company performance. We explore these issues in 
the next section. At this point, we don’t have any statistical evidence to support 
the argument that labor tension affects market or social performance. 
Finally, Table 3 includes estimates of the impact of state ownership on labor 
relations. We hypothesized gradual privatization would lead to rising labor 
tension (H1.3). Table 3 partially disconfirms our hypothesis, after accounting 
for OTE’s profitability and the Greek unemployment rate. Lower state 
ownership actually leads to fewer hours lost due to strikes and to lower 
employment. While lower state holding is accompanied by labor shedding, as 
Haskel and Szymanski (1994) theorize, unions do not become more militant. 
Ferner and Colling (1993) claim unions strike to prevent lower company 
employment levels, but this is not the case with OTE. All OTE employees 
(excluding its subsidiaries and excluding new OTE personnel hired after 2007) 
enjoyed job tenure.  
At the same time, pay raises are generally higher under state monopoly. 
Although the statistical test shows no relationship between state ownership and 
pay raises (Table 3), the actual data tell a different story. The average real 
compensation growth per employee for the period 1994-2000 (our employee 
raise data begin with 1994) stands at 5.38 percent, while the average for the rest 
of the time period under investigation is .34 percent. What makes the difference 
are primarily two years, 1999 and 2000. They show significant spikes in 
employee compensation (an average of 13.28 percent) and coincide with state 
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ownership hovering slightly over 50 percent. In 2001, the state’s share falls to 
41.76 percent. Clearly, the raises were given to “buy” labor’s acquiescence in 
return for the state dropping its majority owner status. In line with Haskel and 
Szymanksi (1994) labor is likely to view privatization when the government is 
no longer majority owner as inimical to its members’ salaries because private 
management wants to keep its costs down. While generous severance packages 
may buy labor’s acquiescence to a sale of state shares in the short run, future 
employee raises under private management are definitely not generous. 
 
6. Regulation and Corporate Performance  
The information gathered through the interviews has corroborated the statistical 
findings, and clarified certain aspects where statistical evidence has remained 
ambiguous. During the period of weak regulation (1995-2000), EETT operates 
under a 1994 law practically in a consultative capacity to the Communications 
minister. It is not a regulator that is taken seriously, let alone feared by market 
players; certainly not by OTE, who provided the staff, resources and even the 
president of EETT until 2000. OTE, backed by the unions, certain government 
ministers, and the so-called “national suppliers” (OTE’s main long-term 
suppliers of equipment) fiercely opposed market liberalization and a 
strengthening of regulation, exhausting all available possibilities for delaying 
the EC-imposed liberalization deadline. This has been illustrated and 
corroborated by several of the people interviewed for this project. The extended 
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deadline for the liberalization of the Greek telecoms sector was set by the EC 
for 1998; Greece obtained a final deadline extension for 1/1/2001. In 2000 a 
new government-appointed president of EETT took over, elected by reinforced 
Parliament majority as an independent regulatory authority on a 5-year term, as 
provided by the new Brussels-originating legislative framework. After 2006, 
the regulatory interventions of EETT are even further intensified, with dense 
regulatory output produced for specific telephony subsectors.  
Since 2000, our interviews have pointed out, EETT graduates into the new 
liberalized environment as an actor with considerable autonomy from the 
government. Often at odds with government ministers eager to safeguard 
OTE’s comfortable profitability and national champion position, EETT was 
emboldened by the institutional backing of the European Commission to 
become OTE’s principal nemesis. The growing EETT pressure on OTE in the 
2000s often was opposed by government officials, especially the Finance 
minister, who, acting as OTE’s major shareholder, was unhappy with the 
squeeze on the company’s profits. Backed by certain government ministers, the 
OTE administration took exception to the European Commission’s support of 
fully fledged competition, arguing instead that a small market such as that of 
Greece needed a strong national telecoms company and could not afford many 
competitors.4  
Under the new framework of regulatory independence in 2000, our interviews 
pointed out, the principal objective of EETT was to break OTE’s monopoly in 
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 Interviews with a former minister and two senior executives of OTE and EETT.  
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the fixed voice telephony market and generate real market competition. To that 
aim, EETT enforced a number of measures that put pressure on OTE, such as 
the possibility of carrier selection and pre-selection by the consumers, number 
portability, and price regulation in liberalized fixed voice telephony. Thus the 
EETT costing (wholesale price) and pricing (retail price) policy slashed OTE’s 
erstwhile monopoly profits, forcing the company to boldly restructure if it were 
to successfully compete.  
EETT forced OTE to allow competing service providers to make use of its 
network (on which it practically had a monopoly) charging them a certain 
wholesale price. After 2001, in an effort to facilitate the creation of real market 
competition, EETT forced OTE to lower its wholesale prices to competitors for 
using its network, while at the same time it prohibited OTE from charging 
consumers (retail price) below a certain threshold which was already well 
above the retail prices of its consumers. In 2004-2008, for example, under the 
price regulation exercised by EETT, the retail prices of OTE were 20-25 
percent higher than those of its competitors. From EETT’s standpoint, the 
policy sought to prevent OTE from applying price squeeze upon its upcoming 
competitors; from OTE’s viewpoint, the company and its infrastructures were 
being cannibalized by its competitors.5 Unable to lower its retail prices in order 
to compete with alternative service providers, OTE suffered a steady decline of 
market share. EETT calculated its wholesale price formula by using forward 
looking cost-accounting methods; that is, calculating costs on the basis of a 
                                                 
5
 This section has relied on interviews with a former minister, three senior EETT executives (present 
and former) and two senior executives of OTE.  
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hypothetical network free from actual OTE inefficiencies, such as high labor 
costs. This amounted to a strong pressure on OTE to improve its cost efficiency 
if it were to survive market competition. Able to attract consumers by offering 
cheaper prices, a growing number of highly aggressive alternative service 
providers started to gradually erode OTE’s market share. Starting from 98 
percent in 2002, the market share of OTE in fixed telephony declined to 66 
percent in 2008 (EETT data). 
Contrary to the initial expectations of EETT, which reflected the European 
Commission doctrine, the competitors of OTE, which entered the market as 
alternative service providers, failed to climb the investment ladder from the 
initial stage of exploiting carrier selection to the final stages of creating their 
own network. The 2001 global telecoms market crash prevented major 
international players from entering the Greek market, though the domestic 
market continued to grow, boosted by the investment and liquidity bonanza in 
preparation for the 2004 Olympic Games. For several years, market 
competition was exercised by service providers who operated as resellers of 
voice telephony, buying at low wholesale price from OTE and reselling to 
clients attracted by their lower retail prices. Thus competition, until the end of 
the period examined, remained focused on services and not infrastructures, 
where OTE dominated.6  
                                                 
6
 As late as 2006, EETT and European Commission pressure led OTE to open a small part of its 
premises to allow competitors to establish equipment and enforced the use of local loop unbundling 
(interviews with EETT and OTE officials). 
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In a labor-intensive service industry such as telecoms, OTE’s exorbitant 
personnel costs in the face of competition became a crippling factor. Hence the 
main way for improving its balance sheet (being a company listed in the Athens 
Stock Exchange and –from 1998—the New York Stock Exchange7 as well) 
was personnel downsizing. The reduction in the number of employees, 
reducing the denominator, improves the appearance of labor productivity 
indicators. Thus, the finding of our statistical analysis is better understood: 
stronger regulation intensifies the pressure of competition, leading to higher 
labor productivity. 
Unable to compete in retail prices, OTE during the 2000s increasingly focused 
its efforts on improving service quality, establishing customer care, launching 
and marketing new consumer products, taking advantage of personnel 
experience, incumbent status, and economies of scale.8 
Under the pressure of competition, the social performance indicators of OTE 
generally improved, and were typically superior to those of its rivals. To that 
aim, OTE exploited the advantages of its monopoly on the network, by offering 
fast repair of technical faults to its own clients and dragging its feet when it 
came to clients of other service providers. For such practices OTE was 
repeatedly sanctioned and fined by EETT. Market pressure did not always lead 
to improvements in social performance indicators: following the 2005-06 mass 
early retirement, OTE lost some of its most experienced personnel, as a result 
                                                 
7
 OTE was delisted from the NYSE in 2010.  
8
 Interviews with two former OTE managers and a senior OTE executive.  
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of which service quality deteriorated and the market share of its competitors 
increased.9 The role of EETT on social performance has been only indirect, 
consisting mainly of a (recent) obligation on companies to publicize social 
performance indicators. But the causal link between regulation and social 
performance was clearly corroborated by the interviews: strong regulation 
intensifies market competition; the force of competition and the effort to defend 
market share lead OTE to improve its social performance (technical faults, 
network reliability, and client service).  
From the early 2000s, OTE faced a rapidly changing environment, which 
included both adverse trends and positive opportunities. One adversity had to 
do with the international trend of substitution of mobile telephony for fixed 
voice telephony, which suppressed OTE’s revenues. To some extent, revenues 
lost to mobile telephony were recovered for the OTE group thanks to its 
competitive mobile telephony subsidiary Cosmote. On the other hand, around 
2003 the broadband trend emerged, which allowed telephone lines to carry 
large capacity online internet access, as opposed to the previous low-data rate 
dial-up connections. OTE had lobbied the government hard to prevent EETT 
from acquiring jurisdiction in regulating broadband prices. As a result of OTE 
pressures, the relevant EC directive was incorporated into national law as late 
as 2006, instead of 2003 as was mandated by the EC. It is worth noting that the 
mobile telephony industry joined OTE in lobbying the government against the 
regulation of broadband prices: OTE’s high retail prices allowed mobile 
                                                 
9
 Interviews with an OTE executive, an EETT executive, and a trade unionist from OTE.  
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telephony companies to attract customers and increase their own broadband 
market shares!10 OTE benefited from the regulatory loophole in 2003-2006 and 
charged high prices for broadband connections. Through the profitability of the 
broadband business the OTE Group compensated for its loss of fixed voice 
telephony market share to mobile telephony. This cross-subsidization practice 
ended in 2006, when last among European telecom regulators EETT acquired 
legal jurisdiction over broadband.11 
 
7. Privatization and Labor Tension  
As mentioned earlier the statistical analysis suggests that labor tensions 
subside, instead of increasing, as privatization progresses. The interviews have 
helped us explain this apparent paradox.12 The qualitative evidence gathered 
from the interviews corroborates our distinguishing critical junctures or 
watershed years in the period examined. As these specific years are watersheds 
in defining the evolving loss of state control over OTE, they are crucial for 
determining the unions’ stance. The crucial years which also represent local 
peaks of labor tension are the following. In 1994 a law is passed by the 1993-
elect PASOK government, following the ND government’s aborted 
privatization attempt. The 1994 law opens the way to OTE’s entry to the stock 
                                                 
10
 A principal motivating factor of this lobbying effort was also that the new legislative framework 
granted EETT the power to regulate the mobile telephony market.   
11
 Information for this section was gathered through interviews with several (acting and former) senior 
executives of EETT and OTE.  
12
 Information for this entire section was gathered through interviews with two former ministers, 
several (acting and former) executives and managers of OTE, one former EETT official, and two trade 
unionists from OTE.  
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market and future partial privatization, setting a minimum government share of 
75 percent; in return to the labor union, the law establishes (or rather confirms) 
job tenure of OTE’s personnel. In 1996 the first 8 percent public offer of OTE 
shares through the Athens Stock Exchange is implemented. In 1998 an 
additional minority stake is offered to investors through stock exchange, and 
the government amends the legislated minimum state share down to 55 percent. 
In 2000 a new law allows the state share to go below 50 percent but above 1/3 
of the company’s equity capital.13  
Labor tension increases after 2004, as the centre-right ND party comes to 
power after 10 years of uninterrupted government by the socialist PASOK. The 
pro-PASOK OTE unions become more aggressive, the number of strikes and 
hours lost in 2005 and 2006 increase dramatically, after a moratorium for the 
2004 year of the Olympic Games. The year 2006 is another watershed, when 
new government legislation abolishes the mandatory minimum 33.4 percent 
government blocking share and repeals (under EC pressure) a 1994 legislative 
provision that any other shareholder owning over 5 percent of the company’s 
shares could not be represented above 5 percent in the OTE general 
shareholders assembly. The intention of the new government-appointed 
management of OTE after 2004 was to bring in an international strategic 
partner-investor, preferably a large advanced Western telecoms company. The 
plan did not materialize until 2008. Instead, in 2007 OTE was subject to a 
hostile takeover bid of over 10 percent of its shares by a private equity fund, 
                                                 
13
 In 2002 the Economy and Finance minister attempted to establish a state golden share but was 
rejected by the European Commission.  
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which gradually, by buying shares from various minority shareholders, raised 
its control towards a 20 percent announced objective (Roussakis, 2010). After 
realizing that it had opened the backdoor to its own contenders, the government 
officially proclaimed it would not accept a private equity fund as strategic 
partner and exercised a set of pressures that finally led to the 2008 entry of 
Deutsche Telecom. In 2008 industrial conflict reaches its peak; the number of 
strikes and hours lost is the highest since 1994, as the unions fight a rear guard 
battle against granting Deutsche Telecom the right to joint management. 
Throughout the period 2004-2008 industrial conflict intensifies, and the 
surrounding political context becomes ripe with poisonous polarization and 
opposition accusations of a sellout of OTE.  
In light of these observations, we re-ran the equation on hours lost (Table 3), 
including a political party variable. It takes the value of 1 for all the years ND 
was in power; 0 otherwise. The results confirm the argument that strikes 
increase significantly when ND is in power. Profitability now becomes 
statistically significant. As profits go up, labor tensions increase in the form of 
hours lost. When company profits increase, unions are more willing to fight for 
more money. Thus, indication is provided of potential rent-sharing between 
OTE and its labor union, the company raises wages in response to threat of 
industrial action (Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey, 1996).  Since the issue is 
not exactly within the remit of this paper, we shall not seek to test or explore it 
any further.  
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The above observations and qualifications notwithstanding, the overall data 
demonstrate that the gradual privatization of OTE leads to lower labor tension. 
The information gathered through the interviews has pointed to a number of 
potential explanations. First, a careful focus on the company’s peak labor 
union, OME-OTE, reveals the limits of industrial action. A powerful federation 
comprising the company’s separate unions representing employees on the basis 
of skills and occupational background (technicians, shop clerks, university 
graduates, radio-telegraphers, etc), OME-OTE enjoyed a density above 90 
percent. The OME-OTE power notwithstanding, its pressure effectiveness 
during the period examined has been steadily declining. As OTE’s monopoly 
erodes, OME-OTE becomes increasingly aware of the limits of industrial 
action. Over the 1990s and especially into the 2000s, OTE is no longer the 
absolute monopoly in telecommunications. From the early 1990s consumers 
can turn to mobile telephony, and from 2001 the fixed voice telephony market 
opens as well. Contrary to the labor union of the monopoly Public Power 
Corporation, whose strikes are feared by the management and the government 
as being capable of paralyzing electricity provision in the country, OTE union 
strikes lack any such pressure impact on the government. Moreover, in a 
market of emerging competitors, prolonged strikes would only cause nuisance 
to the consumers, who would react by turning to alternative telephony 
providers. So limited union power in a non-monopolistic environment was a 
reason why privatization, which evolved in parallel with the gradual (though 
  30 
belated) market liberalization, did not lead to increasing but decreasing labor 
tension.  
A second important explanation is that OME-OTE extracted significant 
concessions in exchange for its acquiescence or tempered opposition to 
privatization. In 1994, job tenure was reassured. During the first public offering 
in 1996, a number of shares were distributed to OTE employees. From 1996, 
attractive voluntary retirement programs were instituted under the pressure of 
OME-OTE. During 1996-2000, a consensus-seeking policy of industrial peace 
was pursued by OTE’s management, concordant with the government policy at 
macro-level. Very favorable enterprise-level collective labor agreements were 
signed, and an extensive bonus system was applied until 2004. Between 1994 
and 2000, the annual average nominal wage increase of the OTE personnel was 
11 percent, without taking into account wage maturity averaging 2.2 percent on 
an annual basis. Until the 2001 liberalization of the telephony market it was 
relatively easier for the company management to satisfy employee 
remuneration demands. The annual average nominal wage increase for 2001-
2008 was ostensibly lower, 3.8 percent, but still positive in real terms. Wage 
increases in OTE were typically above the national collective labor agreement. 
Eventually, as a result of chronic overstaffing, party-clientelistic hiring of 
personnel, and generous remuneration policies, the wage bill of OTE was very 
high. Until 2006, when a large scale voluntary personnel exit was implemented, 
OTE’s wage bill totaled 33 percent of the company’s revenues, compared to 22 
percent average levels for other European national telecom companies.  
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Between 1996 and 2009, the company’s management implemented successive 
early retirement programs agreed with OME-OTE, which benefited a total 
9,700 employees, 2,200 of whom exited the company in 2004-2009. OTE’s 
workforce declined by 38 percent in four years since partial privatization in 
1996, while unionization of newly-hired staff stood at roughly 30 percent as 
opposed to 98 percent for continuing employees (Soumeli, 1999). The 2006 
voluntary exit (agreed with the 2005 collective labor agreement) was an 
example of a lucrative deal with the union in order to minimize its opposition 
to the crucial government-OTE decision to lower the state share below the 33.4 
percent threshold, which had ensured government blocking rights. About 1/3 of 
OTE employees opted for early retirement under very favorable terms, and in 
2006 the company’s personnel fell to 11,700 from 17,300 at the end of 2003. 
OTE lost a large number of employees which included its best qualified 
personnel, who thereafter went on to work in the private sector or as external 
contractors for OTE. 14 The wage bill went down to 26 percent of company 
revenues, only to climb back to 33 percent by 2009 (year of further reduction of 
the government share to 20 percent) as a result of generous wage policies 
combined with declining revenues. Following the 2006 personnel downsizing, 
OTE hired 1,200 new employees for the first time without the legally assured 
job tenure hitherto enjoyed by all its employees. As a result of the 2005-06 
agreement with the management, and the abolition of tenure for new staff in 
specific, OME-OTE suffered a credibility blow; its leadership was accused by 
                                                 
14
 In that sense, to a considerable extent, the employment decline after 2006 represented a shift from 
dependent employment to sub-contracting/ outsourcing, thus suggesting an “increase in flexibilities” 
rather than a “reduction in inefficiencies” (we owe this point to the paper’s referee).  
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the more radical rank-and-file of securing a golden retirement deal for its 
members and unionists, at the expense of job security for future employees.  
Apart from the favorable wage policies, a tradition of effective participation in 
company management is another explanation for the tempered labor union 
opposition to privatization. OTE was a prototypical case of industrial 
democracy; union representation in the company’s governing board was 
established in the early 1980s, as part of the socialist government’s policy of 
“socializing” public enterprises. Eventually, in 2000, the legally binding 
employee representation on the governing board was terminated 
(Zambarloukou, 2010: 244) but the effective (direct or indirect) involvement of 
trade unionists in crucial company decisions remained. In 1990-93, OME-OTE 
had fiercely opposed the eventually aborted privatization plan, which would 
transfer the company management to a private strategic investor. In 1996 the 
new OTE administration was cautious enough to co-opt the labor union into 
accepting the new policy of partial privatization. The policy was given a new 
name, “equitization” (metohopoiese) to avoid association with the unpopular 
term of privatization. The OTE administration implemented the broader 
government strategy of listing major public enterprises on the stock exchange, 
in order to raise capital needed for extensive investment, expose them to higher 
corporate governance standards and the discipline of the markets, and prepare 
them to compete in an eventually liberalized environment (Papoulias, 2007: 
162ff). The management of OTE after 1996 was keen to emphasize the 
inevitability of liberalization of the telecoms market, and the need for OTE to 
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restructure in order to prevent becoming “another Olympic Airways”. The 
specter of the collapsing loss-making national air carrier, erstwhile a powerful 
monopoly enterprise (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008), was a compelling 
counter-example for the employees of OTE.  
OTE enjoyed another tradition that differentiated it from the other flagship 
monopoly public enterprise, the Public Power Corporation. It was not at all 
infrequent for trade unionists to climb the company’s career ladder up to the 
highest echelons. Many evolved into company directors and directors general, 
some even made it to the top. Party political patronage in a corporatist milieu 
had a lot to do with that too. OME-OTE was usually controlled by PASOK 
unionists, which meant privileged access to government power when PASOK 
ruled and political incitement to union mobilization when PASOK was in 
opposition, as during 2004-09. Several ambitious employees had become trade 
unionists in order to accelerate their career development within OTE. Some 
evolved into real power holders in the company’s crucial multi-million value 
procurement decisions, where corruption scandals were later revealed, 
featuring OTE executives in the illicit payroll of major private suppliers.15 This 
evolution and tenacity of power substructures within the company was also an 
inevitable outcome of the brief tenure of OTE’s government-appointed 
administrations, subject to frequent replacement not just upon change of 
government but even upon change of minister. Until 2004, the average tenure 
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 As reported repeatedly in the Greek press over the 1990s and 2000s, and corroborated by two 
interviewees.  
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of the company chairman was only 15 months.16 Thus employee 
representatives remained a real source of institutional memory, continuity and 
influence until the 2000s; after 2004, labor union influence entered a period of 
accelerated decline.  
The close involvement of trade unionists with the company’s operational and 
business matters meant considerable receptiveness to managerial arguments 
articulated by the administration, an attachment to their company, and often 
genuine concern about its future. The unions supported the company’s major 
restructuring and investment projects, as long as these did not involve negative 
repercussions for the personnel. For instance, digitization, OTE’s major 
investment project of the 1990s, had been a long-standing demand of the union, 
as among others it would allow time billing; it took the entire 1990s to be 
implemented, was accelerated after 1996 and completed by 2000, boosting the 
company’s revenues. A certain degree of “corporate patriotism” and pride of 
employees and unionists in their company had been a long tradition of OTE. 
They comprehended the irreversibility of the liberalization prospect, and they 
embraced the managerial vision in the second half of the 1990s of turning OTE 
into a profitable “national champion” active in the entire Southeast European 
region. Indeed, after 1995, an aggressive policy of business expansion led OTE 
to acquire major stakes in several national telecoms companies including those 
of Serbia, Armenia and Romania. In addition, again contrary to other major 
public enterprises such as the Public Power Corporation, OTE had always been 
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 The 2004-appointed Chairman and CEO of OTE lasted for an exceptional duration of six years, until 
his resignation in 2010.  
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internationalized, by virtue of being interconnected with international telecoms 
networks. Since the 1950s OTE had an International Relations Department, 
which was later upgraded into Directorate General. Employees and trade 
unionists traveled a lot—since the 1990s they were frequent travelers to 
Brussels—and OME-OTE was part of the European telecoms union federation. 
All that meant that they were exposed to the evolving international 
transformation of the telecoms sector and capable of understanding the external 
market constraints. Such peer pressure and socialization mitigated union 
militancy. They would strike, “for honor’s sake” (gia tin timi ton oplon), as an 
interviewee put it, but they would generally avoid taking industrial conflict to 
the extreme.  
In the increasingly hostile market environment of the 2000s, and especially 
after 2004, the cost-cutting pressure was felt by the labor unions. They reacted 
with strikes after 2004, also seeking to block what they saw as the imminent 
threat of transfer of the company’s management to the private sector, and 
“foreigners” to boot.17 The new collective agreement and personnel statute 
signed in 2006 abolished job tenure for all new employees and allowed the 
company to hire executives from the market. This was a watershed for OME-
OTE. Deprived of job security for the newly entering employees, OTE’s labor 
unions were confined to a “rearguard battle” (as an interviewee put it) of trying 
to rescue as much of their acquis as possible. 
                                                 
17
 Nationalist reactions had also carried the day during OTE’s first privatization attempt in 1992-93.  
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8. Conclusions 
We assessed the impact of regulation and labor relations on OTE’s market and 
social performance. Our findings generally confirmed but also qualified our 
expectations. As expected, regulation in tandem with reduced state ownership 
generally improves market and social performance. But, as this case study 
showed, much depends on the intensity of regulation, not just its scope. Labor 
plays a critical role in tempering performance in critical junctures of the 
privatization cycle; in order to secure industrial peace in the short run political 
authorities undermine the company’s long-term market performance.   
Decreasing state ownership has a positive effect on the market performance of 
OTE especially when it comes to labor productivity. The growing exposure of 
OTE to institutional investors, market pressures and rising standards of 
corporate governance improves the quality of its management and enhances its 
market performance. Similar is the effect on social performance. This is not so 
with profitability; privatization erodes monopoly profits if it evolves in a 
liberalizing market environment. In the 2000s it is difficult to dissociate the 
decreasing state ownership of OTE from the intensifying telecoms market 
liberalization.  
Increasing regulatory intensity steadily opens way to OTE’s competitors, 
reducing its market share, and squeezing its profitability. Moreover, the 
regulatory “commitment problem” intensifies. Because OTE is forced to offer 
its network to competing service providers at low cost, the company becomes 
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reluctant to invest, viewing it as free-riding on its own accumulated 
investments on the network. OTE revenues, investment in fixed assets and 
profitability all follow the same trend: they peak around 2000 and begin to 
decline after 2001. On the other hand, by strengthening market competition, 
increasing regulatory intensity forces OTE to improve its social performance in 
order to defend its market share.  
Privatization increases political involvement prima facie. But, as privatization 
progresses, labor tensions subside, instead of increasing. This surprising result 
of the statistical analysis was corroborated and explained, but also qualified, by 
the qualitative evidence gathered through the interviews. Overall, the evolution 
of privatization in parallel with the opening of the telecoms market to 
competition pressures the OTE labor union into tempering labor tension. The 
broader implication of this argument is that political involvement persists in 
OTE but in ways that are different before privatization began. First, direct 
government control has shifted in favor of indirect measures of influence, 
especially profits. Monopolies were extended to retain market share and 
profitability even as the state progressively loosened its ownership grip. 
Second, regulatory reform is not as easy as one might expect. Monopolists will 
not give up their power to extract high profits without a fight. This is especially 
true in Greece because of lack of technical expertise. In the first couple of 
years, OTE acted both as “poacher and gamekeeper,” providing experts and 
manpower to the regulator. As regulation grows stronger, the scope for overt 
political pressure weakens not only over the privatized company but also over 
  38 
the regulator. With some delay, the constellation of company, labor, and 
management interests realigns and company performance improves somewhat. 
Third, this case study demonstrates that privatization does not simply involve 
an outright sale of shares but is accompanied by delicate labor policy. OTE’s 
privatization became more politically palatable when the government “bought” 
union acquiescence through generous benefit packages. This was shrewd 
politics in the short-run but saddled OTE with high labor costs over time. 
Subsequent performance, in other words, does not only depend on ownership or 
regulation but also political maneuvering when it comes to labor policy. The 
triangle of labor, management, and politicians now becomes a pentagon of 
management, labor, politicians, regulator, and, to a lesser extent, competitors. 
Performance generally improves, but relations among stakeholders are now far 
more complicated. 
While the literature tends to emphasize certain effects of privatization and 
regulation on company performance, this case study has provided fresh insight 
on the conditions of implementation and the importance of sequencing of both 
policies. In the initial stages of regulation, the regulator remains captured by 
the monopolistic public enterprise. Similarly, in the initial stages of gradual, 
partial privatization, management and government decisions are part of a 
broader bargain with the union, whose power is entrenched by a combination of 
monopoly rents, job tenure, and political resources. At the end of the day, union 
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power is undercut not just by the progressing company privatization, but by the 
growing intensity and depth of market regulation as well. 
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Appendix  
 
 
Table 1. Regulation and OTE’s Market and Social Performance 
 
 Market Performance Social Performance 
 Labor1 Capital1       Size2       Profits2   Faults2 Reliability2 
State -.017 -.036 -.013         .002 .342 -.371 
 
(.004)*** (.012)** (.004)**   (.030) (.088)*** (.110)*** 
Regulation .313 .397 .167          .209 -4.80 -1.75 
 
(.115)** (.149)**     (.100)      (.741) (1.96)** (2.64) 
Growth .040 -.024 .018          .067 -.032 .588 
 
(.038) (.037)  (.032)       (.228) (.627)  (.857) 
Constant 5.10 6.54 7.99           4.79 14.52 97.86 
 
(.411)*** (1.66)***   (.398)***   (2.76)   (7.82)** (9.94)*** 
Adjusted R2 .564 .423 .885            .250 .809 .541 
N 17 16 17 17 17 17 
 
1
 OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
2
 Prais-Winsten coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
* .05<p≤.10, ** .01<p≤.05, *** p≤ .01; two-tailed 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Labor and OTE’s Market and Social Performance 
 
 Market Performance Social Performance 
 Labor1 Capital1       Size1       Profits2   Faults1 Reliability2 
State -.024 -.013 -.017         .001 .459 -.327 
 
(.003)*** (.005)**     (.004)*** (.029) (.064)*** (.099)** 
Hours Lost .010 -.028 -.008 -.118 .303 -.576 
 
(.039) (.040) (.030)         (.143) (.620) (.583) 
Growth .091 .008 .052         .039 -.885 .123 
 
(.055) (.053) (.043)      (.222) (.881) (.842) 
Constant 5.76 4.22 8.55          6.65 -2.51 100.8 
 
(.613)*** (.656)***   (.489)*** (2.78)** (9.88) (10.52)*** 
Adjusted R2 .684 .641 .786              .240 .870 .557 
N 17 16 17 16 17 17 
 
1
 OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
2
 Prais-Winsten coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
** .01<p≤.05, *** p≤ .01; two-tailed 
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Table 3. Privatization and Labor Tension1 
 
 Employees1 Hours Lost2 Hours Lost2 Raises1 
State .009 .042 .030 .010 
 
(.001)*** (.005)*** (.008)*** (.046) 
Profitability -.003 .832 .373 .591 
 
(.019) (.175)*** (.290) (1.06) 
Unemployment .068 -.077 -.752 2.24 
 
(.023)** (.173) (.216)*** (1.03)* 
Party  2.42   
 
 (.477)***   
Constant 8.68 3.85 14.85 -23.53 
 
(.273)*** (2.44) (2.75)*** (12.65)* 
Adjusted R2 .995 .981 .807 .137 
N 16 16 16 14 
 
1
 OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
2
 Prais-Winsten coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
** .01<p≤.05, *** p≤ .01; two-tailed 
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